میلاد احمدزاده

Abstract

The advent of the modern era in the West led to the emergence of empiricist schools in the philosophy of science. These schools, ranging from logical positivism—which takes an extreme approach by attempting to justify scientific validity solely based on logical analysis of language and sensory experience—to its critics, such as Kuhn and Popper, have all sought to establish criteria for distinguishing science from non-science and pseudo-science. The concept of science has changed throughout history, and today, science is understood as empirical knowledge rather than absolute knowledge, with the philosophy of science focusing on explaining this type of knowledge. However, through a precise understanding of the application of the term "science" and its related concepts, such as knowledge and consciousness, within philosophical systems, it is possible to facilitate dialogue between philosophical-theological traditions and the contemporary philosophy of science, thereby resolving existing conflicts. This interdisciplinary research first reviews various movements in the philosophy of science and examines different meanings of science in Western and Islamic traditions. It then compares the approach of Muslim thinkers—focusing on Avicenna and Suhrawardi—with the empiricist perspective. By exploring the origins of the terms "non-science" and "pseudo-science", particularly in light of Popper’s viewpoint, the study aims to establish a dialogue between the perspectives of Avicennan and Illuminationist systems and contemporary philosophy of science. To this end, it examines Avicenna’s coherent system, which emphasizes the demonstrability of knowledge, and Suhrawardi’s structured philosophy, which considers direct intuitive experience—not its interpretative form—as a religious experience that serves as both a source of knowledge alongside other sources and as the foundation of all knowledge. The study concludes that, despite differences in their definitions of knowledge, both thinkers acknowledged pseudo-scientific candidates such as occult sciences in their discussions and, given their broad definition of science as absolute knowledge and consciousness, recognized some or all of these candidates. Furthermore, this research critically examines Popper’s perspective, demonstrating that his criteria for science—such as falsifiability—apply solely to empirical knowledge as one type of knowledge. Contrary to common interpretations, Popper does not assign a strictly negative meaning to non-science or pseudo-science. Based on this framework, the study evaluates certain pseudo-scientific candidates, including traditional medicine and occult sciences such as Astrology and Jafr. Finally, it conducts a comparative analysis of Avicennism, Illuminationism, and the Western approach within both empirical and non-empirical domains under the broader category of knowledge.

Keywords: Science, Knowledge, Avicenna, Suhrawardi, Pseudoscience, Ontology of Science, Karl Popper, Empiricism, Philosophy of Science, Occult Sciences