کورش سلیمی

This dissertation addresses one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of language and meaning: how can language be coordinated with reality? The issue is formulated in the “Kripke–Wittgenstein skeptical paradox” concerning rule-following, which raises deep epistemological and semantic challenges. To analyze the paradox, the main responses in the literature are >On the basis of these critiques, the dissertation seeks to reinforce Kripke’s account of meaning against its objections. Its proposal, articulated as the Dynamic Network of Particular Beliefs, can be understood as a synthetic reconstruction: Kripke’s communitarian criterion of objectivity is retained, but supplemented with a mental layer of similarity-driven tendencies, thereby restoring individual judgment and agency. In this way, the central weakness of Kripke’s solution—rendering individual language impossible—is addressed without reverting to metaphysics or universal definitions.

Within this framework, meaning is understood through two interwoven components: ۱. the speaker’s conscious belief in the community’s linguistic practices; ۲. the human mind’s natural inclination to extend family-resemblance networks, which allows the application of words to novel cases without recourse to abstract definitions or infinite regress of interpretations.

Language users acquire meaning by observing particular instances of communal usage, and then extend it by similarity to new situations. Thus they can distinguish correct applications, creatively expand linguistic practice, and revise errors.

In light of this reconstruction, language is not private but rather individual–social: its guidance occurs in the individual mind, yet its rules are always situated within a communal framework. Accordingly, the dissertation advances a strengthened version of Kripke’s solution—one that preserves normativity and dynamism while also explaining the indispensable role of individuality.