امیر صمصامی

This dissertation is dedicated to the investigation and interpretation of one of the most enduring problems in the history of philosophy, as articulated by two of its most eminent figures. The relation betwee  thinking and being—which may be regarded as the  grand-problem  of the philosophical tradition—finds in the idealism of  lato and Hegel  a shared orientation. This common approach provides the possibility of an answer that serves as the guiding thread of the present inquiry. Following the preliminary considerations and the clarification of the problem's formal structure in the first chapter,  Chapter Two  offers a rigorous exposition of the Platonic position. This task commences with a discussion on the doctrine of the  unity  of virtue and knowledge  in the early dialogues. Subsequently, by referencing the  Phaedo  and the  Republic, an initial form of Platonic idealism is presented as an account of the  intelligibility of being. Through a detailed interpretation of the  Parmenides—aimed at demonstrating the logical foundation of  metexi  (the participation of being in the Idea) within the dialectic of the One and the Many—and a further analysis of the dialectic, dynamism, and interweaving of Ideas in the  Sophist, the nuances of Platonic idealism are elucidated. This trajectory yields a defensible version of Plato’s stance regarding the relation between thinking and being. Chapter Three  undertakes the examination of the relation between thinking and being withi  Hegel’s absolute Idealism, focusing on the  Phenomenology of Spirit  and the  Science of Logic. Initially, through the lens of the  Phenomenology—namely, Hegel’s account of the experience of consciousness—the necessity of idealism in determining the relation of thinking to being is prepared. Subsequently, through a comprehensive interpretation of the  Science of Logic  as the system of the  elf-determination of pure  thinking, the specific position of Hegelian Absolute Idealism concerning the central problem of this research attains its precise formulation.  Finally, in the  concluding chapter, by juxtaposing the findings regarding the idealism of both philosophers and integrating supplementary considerations, the convergences that illuminate the relation of thinking and being are discussed across five thematic focal points. In its entirety, the present inquiry may be construed as a  apologia for idealism, wherein the unity of thinking and being is not a mere construct, but a  recollection. It is within the horizon of such a recollection that the standpoint of  knowledge  —as the specific relation of the human being to being—is justified, thereby vindicating the human right to think about being. Idealism, in this light, is the very  recollection and articulation of freedom.